This article reviews two noteworthy new books in geopolitics: “Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century” by Alasdair Roberts, and “The Small States Club: How Small Smart States Can Save the World” by Armen Sarkissian, the former Armenian prime minister and president. Roberts’ book focuses on the great powers, or what he terms “superstates,” while Sarkissian’s book explores the influence of small states within the international system.
The review begins by demonstrating the continuous changes in political borders over the past centuries. In 1910, around 80% of the world was controlled by a few European empires, with much of the rest under the Ottoman and Qing dynasties. However, two world wars and decolonization led to the emergence of many new nation-states. The United Nations, which had 51 members in 1945, now has 193. Most of these new states are old nations that gained independence from former empires, including European colonies in Asia and Soviet republics. These states and the current international system differ vastly from the vast empires that dominated most of recorded history.
Despite the proliferation of new states post-World War II, the era of empires has left a lasting legacy. Alongside the creation of new states, there has been a rise in “superstates,” as described by political scientist Alasdair Roberts. Roberts identifies China, India, the United States, and the European Union as the largest political entities today. By 2050, these superstates will house 40% of the global population. While they differ from historical empires by taking more responsibility for their citizens’ welfare, they face similar challenges in managing vast, diverse populations. Each superstate has its own approach, but their size, economic power, and complexity distinguish them from smaller states, making them fundamental shapers of modern geopolitics. Roberts argues that the emerging international system is marked by significant differences in state sizes, making it a “superstate world.”
While Sarkissian’s book examines how small states like Armenia can succeed on the global stage, suggesting that smallness can be advantageous and challenges the bias toward large states, Roberts highlights the fragility and governance challenges of superstates. Together, these works illustrate the complexities of an evolving international system.
Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century:
For much of human history, empires dominated political organization, exerting loose control over diverse populations without a unifying ethnic or linguistic identity. As nation-states began to emerge in the 19th century, thinkers debated the merits of size. Friedrich List, a German economist, argued that small states would struggle to prosper and compete with larger states and imperial powers. British philosopher John Stuart Mill contended that, to the contrary, size and diversity were enemies of democracy, claiming that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made of different nationalities.”
These ideas were tested in the 20th century. After World War I, and more definitively after World War II, a new international architecture emerged, dismantling old empires and promoting the rise of nation-states. Roberts and Sarkissian attribute the survival of many smaller countries to the establishment of international institutions like the United Nations, which upheld national sovereignty and discouraged territorial invasion. Globalization, technological advances, and lowered commercial barriers also enabled smaller countries to enhance their positions in the global economy.
Simultaneously, some large countries expanded further. The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 left Russia diminished, but China, India, the United States, and the European Union have grown to govern vast, complex societies and territories in a quasi-imperial manner. Roberts notes that these modern “superstates” differ from historical empires by being accountable to their citizens. He describes superstates as “hybrid polities, governing vast territories and diverse populations, and having important features of both empires and states”. Unlike empires, superstates possess advanced technologies like the Internet and surveillance tools and must meet welfare and human rights demands from increasingly urbanized populations, which are capable of exerting significant pressure on governments.
Roberts is primarily concerned with the durability of superstates, suggesting that their failure or disintegration would lead to substantial instability and conflict. Despite the United States’ 250-year history, there is no guarantee of its survival for another 250 years or that superstates, in general, will be more robust than their imperial predecessors. Superstates face numerous threats, including external attacks, rebellions, climate change, disease, internal disparities, economic shifts, and technological developments. These issues are magnified by internal diversity and policy divisions, as superstates lack the focused goals of smaller states.
Roberts concludes that centralization can paradoxically weaken empires and superstates, citing the Soviet Union’s brittleness due to over-centralization. In contrast, he views the EU’s model of cohesion without coercion, functioning by consensus without the power to enforce decisions on its members, as a source of strength and resilience, making it potentially more durable than other superstates.
Despite these distinctions, modern superstates may not be significantly different from recent empires. For instance, modern ideals like the American “city on a hill,” Xi Jinping’s “China Dream,” and Narendra Modi’s “Vishwa Guru” (world teacher) echo the civilizing missions of earlier empires. Technology and globalization continue to blur borders, challenging the Westphalian state’s assumptions of absolute sovereignty, hard borders, loyal citizens, and a monopoly of violence. Historian Charles Maier and others argue that empires never disappeared; they merely transformed, making the difference between an empire and a superstate one of degree rather than kind.
The Small States Club:
Armen Sarkissian’s book diverges sharply from Alasdair Roberts’ focus on superstates by emphasizing the challenges and significance of small states. Drawing from his unique experiences as someone who led the small state of Armenia as it transitioned away from the Soviet Union, Sarkissian offers a compelling mix of personal reminiscences, advocacy for Armenia, and a broader case for the relevance of small states in today’s multipolar world.
Sarkissian defines a small state as one with a population of less than 15 million. By this measure, 164 of the world’s 237 states qualify, excluding most East, South, and Southeast Asian countries. Notably, half the world’s states have less territory than Portugal, and 41 of these states are microstates with populations under a million. Sarkissian argues that the survival of small states is precarious in a rapidly changing world characterized by political, geopolitical, social, and technological upheavals. He explores how these “minnows” can navigate a world dominated by the “sharks” of large states.
In his exploration, Sarkissian examines the experiences of ten successful small states: Botswana, Estonia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and Armenia. He highlights how these countries have leveraged their unique advantages, such as location, local talent, ingenuity, and natural resources, to build dynamic economies and play influential roles in regional geopolitics. For example, Botswana is praised for its economic prudence and governance, Singapore for its economic dynamism and diplomatic acumen, and the UAE’s founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, for uniting the emirates into a single entity.
Sarkissian’s admiration for these states is evident, but he acknowledges that they represent exceptions rather than the norm among small states. His selection of successful examples may obscure the challenges faced by less fortunate small states. Moreover, the replicability and scalability of these successes are questionable.
Sarkissian identifies four key ingredients for a successful small state: a strong national identity, robust leadership, a clear national vision, and methodical strategic planning. He notes that many successful small states have close ties to the West, which has provided them economic advantages and access. He also sees technological advancements as enabling small states to overcome traditional limitations imposed by geography, power politics, and traditional geopolitics. For instance, Singapore’s strategic shift to research and development in 1991 transformed its economy, while Israel’s investment in education and technology has bolstered its security. Technological innovations, particularly in communication and surveillance, have allowed small states to gain economic and technological leverage, disrupting the dominance of larger states.
Sarkissian’s techno-optimism extends to the potential of artificial intelligence to level the playing field between big and small states. He envisions a world where significant actors can be small states, private companies like Google, and even individuals like Elon Musk. As a practical politician, Sarkissian emphasizes the importance of regional balances, economic and military development, and strategic alliances for small states to ensure their survival and prosperity in a world marked by great-power competition and shifting geopolitical landscapes.
The Problems of Size:
Armen Sarkissian posits that small states are not only adept at technocratic achievements but can also play a moral role in the international system. He argues that while large states seek dominance, small states pursue stability. Sarkissian advocates for a “small states club” to promote their interests and foster global peace. However, this idealized view is challenged by the reality that many small states have struggled economically and militarily and are not immune to internal conflict or war. Despite these issues, both Sarkissian and Alasdair Roberts agree that the rise of small states is evidence of a more ordered and less violent world.
This perspective is influenced by the significant shift in attitudes towards war post-1950, reflected in international laws and norms, particularly in the West. However, it overlooks the continuous violence during the Cold War, especially in maritime Asia. Historian Charles Tilly’s assertion that “war made the state, and the state made war” suggests that the creation of small states served the Cold War strategies of superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union supported decolonization and the dismantling of older European empires in the 1950s and 1960s, partly because it allowed them to cultivate client states and exert influence over international affairs. This strategy also enabled them to conduct proxy wars in regions far from their own territories.
Today, great-power rivalry has changed the dynamics for both big and small states. Small states can leverage this competition, by hedging and playing bigger states off against one another. But the ongoing retreat from globalization threatens their stability, as the lack of a settled international order and the weakening of post-World War II norms hits small states the hardest.
Despite their size, small states face significant challenges, as evidenced by Armenia’s recent territorial losses to Azerbaijan. Large states, such as Russia in Ukraine and the US in Afghanistan, also encounter difficulties in imposing their will on smaller states. Thus, the current global disorder impacts all states, regardless of size, making it increasingly challenging to achieve desired outcomes.
