Europe finds itself in the most critical and decisive phase of the last 75 years, caused by disasters both natural and manmade. These crises are not limited to the still ongoing Russian-Ukraine war and the long-term natural developments of climate change, both of which are now called megatrends and which have already shown their effects by altering the global security order. The war has not only directly affected Ukraine and Europe’s security order but has also accelerated the process of transformation in the global order, which is also being sped up by the changes seen in nature. Europe finds itself in a critical moment that might be what determines Europe’s future; will it shape its own destiny or be determined by others?
With Europe’s future at stake, the current moment also presents itself as one of Germany’s toughest tests for security politics since the founding of the federal republic. It is well-known that Germany plays a giant role in shaping the viability of Europe’s future due to its economic and political weight. This means it will necessarily contribute towards Europe’s ability to act, either positively through its contribution or negatively through its absence. For an active contribution, Germany would need to recognize two central challenges that necessitate a 180-degree reversal of policies that have not been questioned for decades. The first of which is defense policy in which there is no robust plan or serious discussion of what militarization means for Germany or how it can be achieved despite the Russian invasion. The second of these are security policy which has been detached from economics, public life and the defense of German law, finding its place exclusively in foreign affairs using civilian means. This principle of order is also reflected in the clear separation of responsibilities between the federal government, states, and private actors, such as operators of power plants or IT infrastructure. Integrated approaches are the exception. This internal German principle of political isolation does not provide answers to the changing global order or the questions that will drive Europe’s future and determine Germany’s security. It is therefore necessary for Germany to rethink and re-establish its security policy beyond a reactionary force in the Russian-Ukraine War to one that is ready for future challenges. The external turning point of these policies likewise requires an internal turning point, and it is only a successful German turning point that will enable a successful European turning point.
The effect of Germany’s security, economic and socio-political disorder for Europe has been evident in the Russian War. Firstly, the war has directly changed the security situation and the conditions under which European states and their allies must ensure security on the continent. It acts as an accelerator for the ongoing transformation of the global order in the areas of security, technology, economy, and democracy, as well as for the fight against climate change. Thirdly, the war acts like a future-changing explosion, shifting the trajectories of major trends in politics, economy, and technology. Germany and Europe are still in an area of uncertainty of which direction and what consequences to take, creating both risks but also opportunities. How the attempt to reduce energy dependency on Russia has accelerated the German energy transition is an example of a reaction with effects that change the inner policies and potentials and how Europe by large follows suit. All of the aforementioned changes have something in common: they cannot exist without each other and carry long-term effects. Nevertheless, the discussion on how Germany and Europe should respond is currently stuck mostly in the here and now and German discourse is still determined to look back rather than forward. The world today, however, is changing and these changes bring with them different risks and opportunities and provide a chance to set a fundamentally new framework for German security policy. This framework must not only be about responding appropriately to the war but also about positioning German security policy beyond the war to deal with and shape future shocks. This requires a deeper and fundamental revision of all previous assumptions, structures and processes in Germany and Europe. The federal government must therefore develop a plan on how to sensibly reassemble the elements of order that have been disrupted by the war, whether it be by the role of military force or the influence of technological developments.
While the necessity is more apparent than ever, there is no blueprint ready for this new order. Areas of defense, economy, climate, energy, technology, and democracy are known to be old and deficient and the many problems plaguing them are not new, yet it remains to be determined what role each of these areas should play in the future. What is new and complicating this change is that these challenges are occurring simultaneously and time is running out. Therefore, the coming years of restructuring for Europe will be a period of great uncertainty and instability. In constructing a robust order, Germany and Europe should be guided by three central questions: What does a good European order look like and how does it provide and protect European values? How can it be built and what resistance will it face? Once built, how can it be maintained?
While reorganization has already begun and will pick up pace with time, time is a crucial factor. The Ukraine War and its consequences have shown the uncertainties about the continuity of peace in Europe and its political unity. However, none of this can obscure Germany’s key role in the success of a new European security policy, which first and foremost requires a successful reorientation of the Federal Republic. Germany’s ability to act is limited by four key dependencies and drag Europe along with it. The first of which includes its dependency on Russia for fossil fuels such as gas and material. Germany has long been dependent on Russia, seen as a place for both cheap and secure trade to secure its economic prosperity and enable social welfare. Germany is now paying the price for this dependency and its disentanglement, economically and politically. Another one of these dependencies exists in its place of market for German companies but increasingly also in the areas of societal infrastructure, which are focusing on China. Chinese investments in both IT in public communication and transport infrastructure make up huge places in the German economy. Besides economic dependency on China, the relation of interests does not go both ways as China supports Russia and has no interest in a strong Germany which would work for Western interests. Traditionally, Europe depended on the USA for its military security and Germany has acted as the head of this structure in Europe. This remains true today and the US supports Ukraine not only quantitatively but also in terms of weaponry in a way that no other country can, enabling Ukraine to wage war in a manner impossible without US support. The US thus opens up options for European security that Germany could not provide and without its support, Europe would not be able to defend itself in a classic military scenario. However, as dependencies on Russia and especially China become increasingly problematic, the importance of the US is also rising in terms of shared markets and technologies as they offer an alternative to Russian and Chinese options. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that the war in Ukraine will not affect the US’s long-term focus on the Indo-Pacific and China, meaning that Germany and Europe will need to allocate more resources for their own security in the future. Finally, Germany has a dependency on the EU both politically, economically and as a wider legal community. While Germany greatly benefits from the single market trading power of the EU, it is also the answer to Germany’s importance in geopolitics. It has placed itself as the single most important and influential European country and is the face of the EU. For no other country in Europe is this positioning so important. Indeed, Germany’s allies still ask whether the historical experience with the predecessors of the Federal Republic could repeat itself and pose a risk to the continent’s security. This, often dubbed as the ‘German Question’, is particularly important today because of the security promises made in the EU and NATO which cannot exist without Germany.
While these dependencies are largely external threats, there still exists an internal tension threatening the EU and therefore Germany, affecting its ability to fulfill its role as the consensus-building mechanism in Europe. Essential questions of the EU are postponed by member states because of the decreasing trust in the EU and its future. The most recent challenge is the potential admission of Ukraine, Moldova, and the six Balkan states. While it is clear that the EU cannot handle this in its current constitution, there is no reform movement in the near future. The European political community also shows itself close to states that are near a full union membership, calling into question old foreign policy security concepts of integration and stability export to the neighborhood but also highlighting the lack of any other alternatives. In the end, Germany must eliminate or at least reduce its dependencies on Russia, China and the US to make more room for itself and to avoid coercion. Dependency on the US could be developed into a mutual responsibility of defense knowing that US interests do not always correspond to German interests while the EU needs to be transformed into a more effective framework. The next five years are going to be crucial for these processes. Germany and other European countries will have to depend on political and social cohesion within the other union states to have room to maneuver. In 2024, the elections in the UK, Finland, Slovakia, Romania, and Lithuania as well as the EU Parliament could further weaken this state. Elections overseas, especially the American presidential elections, will also impact Europe. If the elections results in a loss of political leadership from Washington, European unity could be difficult to maintain with old divisions resurfacing regarding Russia, Ukraine and NATO. While these issues concern all of Europe, it is specifically Germany who has a key role to play as the most significant economic and political power in Europe with its vulnerabilities exposed. The Federal Republic must address its dependencies, find new energy sources, diversify supply chains, and open new markets. Politically, Berlin is still adjusting to its new role: The war in Ukraine has forced Germany to take a more active role in European security and defense while it remains hesitant to take decisive military actions. The coming years will be crucially nationally and will answer whether Germany can succeed in securing long-term financial plans for its defense. The only defense spending so far has been a one-time 100 billion euro special fund for the Bundeswehr, leading to questions regarding the ability of the national security strategy to analyze and define Germany’s needs and ambitions and whether it is ready to continue its energy transition and reduce dependencies on China.
Germany is still primarily reacting and trying to influence the immediate consequences of the war and global trends. This is insufficient in a time when things are developing rapidly; rather a long-term, resilient restructuring is needed. The initial urgency which enabled quick decision making in core areas is already fading along with the desire to make real profound changes. The implementation of the turning point in defense policy among others is progressing slowly and seemingly without a real plan. Germany also needs an internal political and social turning point to realign its foreign policy. This would include a reassessment and realignment of its Russia policy or the development of a new Eastern policy that views countries not through the lens of Russia lens but as individual actors. It would further need a practical reform of defense and a new understanding of Germany in EU and NATO. While there is certainly different resistances in these areas, without a paradigm shift there exists a risk of reverting to ineffective old approaches. Problems are interconnected and isolated solutions encounter issues in other areas such as the state and system failure in defense or resistance to effective security concepts on the federal level. Germany, which has not changed since the Cold War, in which security evolved from isolated hotspots to a crisis arc surrounding Europe and its borders needing a capable military, must unwaveringly keep preserving the will to change if it wants to keep up with the world. Considerable time has passed since Olaf Scholz’s ‘Zeitwende’ speech in the Bundestag and Germany has lost a crucial year for this overhaul with little time left for the 12 to 15 year estimate for the total transformation. The Russian invasion has demonstrated Germany’s capacity to eliminate dependencies with incredible speed. It is this speed which is needed in the defense sector and its entire political orientation which must be ensured in the context of systemic conflict to proactively influence the effects of mega trends. This means overcoming the previously dominant model of reacting to external shocks to enable it to act under the new conditions. This realignment will be complete once Germany has the ability to act in the context of systemic conflict in four areas: assessment capability, cooperation capability beyond Europe, conflict capability, and prevention capability.
Germany is facing many difficulties in redefining its security policy due to the historical context of Germany’s pacifist and liberal stance in post-Cold War international relations, which has left the nation cautious about military engagement or meaningful security politics. However, the realities of megatrends and the global security environment fueled by the Russian invasion show that this stance is outdated and necessitates a change at the fundamental level. This need was acknowledged in Chancellor Scholz’s famous ‘Zeitwende’ speech but nothing substantial has followed yet. It is clear that Germany must break free from its historical constraints and adopt a more assertive and proactive role in global security which must integrate various interconnected sectors like politics, administration, military, and industry. The same Russian crisis that highlighted the need for reform in these areas also highlighted Germany’s capabilities, through the speed with which the nation abandoned its energy dependency on Russia and became independent in this area. It is simply this same will and speed which is needed in security which is not any less necessary or crucial. The article pinpoints the key dependencies and the eventual state of them once this ‘Zeitwende’ is fulfilled. The next 12 to 15 years could either present us with a Germany still behind the changes other nations have made since the Cold War or a dynamic Germany able to act swiftly and influence Europe and global mega trends and not simply react to them.