Defense ministers in presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems are considered as the bridge between civilian and military establishment. This paper analyzes the factors that contribute towards the selection process of a defense minister. The authors of this research-based article evaluated multiple governing systems by taking a sample from 1975 to 2015. The study applies multivariate cross-sectional time series and survival analysis approach to test the sample both quantitatively and qualitatively. The findings indicate that in a presidential system the appointment of a military defense minister is preferable over a civilian defense minister, whether he is serving or retired. Although the appointment of a military defense minister is favorable for positive civil-military relations, the increasing military influence may undermine the accountability process. Moreover, presidential democracies are more vulnerable to military coups than parliamentary democracies, and there is a pattern of post-military coup governments across the world that adopted a presidential system. Furthermore, by evaluating the parliamentary form of government, the study finds appointments of a civilian defense minister more frequent than a military official because of coalition government or parliamentary compulsion. Whereas in a presidential and semi-presidential form of government, head of State does not need any coalition support, therefore he or she is able to formulate the cabinet independently. The authors conclude that unitary form of government, especially presidential, tend more towards the military establishment and hence the appointment of military defense ministers are utilized for this purpose.
