In this article, Christopher Matt examines the rise of Türkiye as a middle power, which he argues is a precursor of a new age of polycentrism. His article focuses on two main themes: Türkiye’s pioneering middle-power rise and how it came to be, and what that means for any potential middle powers and the new world order in a broader sense.
Matt argues that middle powers typically emerge in a world without a dominant global hegemon, ideological universalism, or clear-cut Manichean binaries. The rise of multipolarity and middle powers, at least in the case of Türkiye, started following the Great Recession of 2008, which provided the ideal conditions for middle powers to thrive. A middle power, in this context, is an entity with regional ambitions, but one that has no interest in being part of any global balances, like that of conventional global powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia. To Matt, the rise of Türkiye as a middle power is emblematic of a more significant shift in the global landscape: geopolitical diversification. Broadly speaking, geopolitical diversification creates a wider array of opportunities, as actors pivot away from meta-narratives and end-of-history ideologies. Instead, the focus shifts to reality and history. “The new era is marked by the return to traditional and regionally-focused competition between a medley of actors,” where actors are “driven primarily by their immediate, interest-based, and physical security needs.”
In such a landscape, Türkiye is an archetypical middle power state, having moved ahead of the curve in embracing this new reality and form of politics. As such, Türkiye serves “as an interesting bellwether for what might be to come.”
To Matt, however, Türkiye’s recognition of this new structural reality and its embrace of its role as a middle power state was not without challenges. Ankara had to navigate and adapt to new structural conditions in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Most notably, Türkiye became part of the Syrian civil war, and remains so to this day. Türkiye has faced significant challenges from its embroilment in the Syrian civil war, due to a number of factors such as entering into treacherous alliances with unreliable and fanatical non-state actors, to the point that a case can be made that its assertive policy towards the Middle East has initially outweighed the benefits. Still, Ankara has demonstrated remarkable pragmatism. It managed to hold its ground against its Russian rivals in Syria while keeping communication channels open with Moscow for de-escalation. Ankara even maintained a window for partnering with Moscow on other issues where the two’s positions are more aligned. This approach, dubbed “diplomatic compartmentalization” by Matt, allowed Türkiye to balance competing interests and maintain its position.
Türkiye’s compartmentalized foreign policy reached its full potential with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As a NATO member, Türkiye was expected to join the anti-Russian bloc as part of its commitments to NATO, however, it chose not to adhere strictly to NATO’s sanctions policy against Moscow. Instead, Türkiye maintained its de-escalatory bilateral relations with Russia. This positioning allowed Ankara to become a central pivot and intermediary for negotiations concerning the Black Sea region. Simultaneously, it enabled its private sector to engage in business with both Russia and Ukraine. The Istanbul Conference, although ultimately thwarted by former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, may have played a role in Russia’s withdrawal from Kyiv’s outskirts in the earlier stages of the war. Despite this setback, Türkiye’s role as a Black Sea power broker has only grown more significant since 2022. For instance, Türkiye successfully negotiated a deal to export grain, albeit temporarily, from the Black Sea without fear of Russian military interception.
There is a strong case to be made that Ankara will likely continue, if not expand, its current diplomatic strategy. It remains the most significant non-combatant stakeholder in the Ukraine war, having carved out a unique diplomatic niche. While other NATO countries have refused to engage diplomatically with the Ukraine war crisis, Türkiye has positioned itself, from the early stages of the war, as a rational and pragmatic alternative, thereby reinforcing its influence and importance on the global stage.
Matt then focuses on the role that Türkiye’s geographic location plays in this rise. To Ankara, its positioning along the Straits of Marmara is a critical asset. As the de facto gatekeeper of the Black Sea, Türkiye is a desirable partner and a formidable rival. It has leveraged this position throughout its century-long history as a republic and even before. For example, the Ottoman Empire’s ability to deny aid from Britain and France to Imperial Russia led to the collapse of the Russian front and set the stage for the Battle of Gallipoli. After the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the UK and France attempted to internationalize the straits, but the newly founded Turkish Republic managed to retain control by leveraging the crucial location of the Straits. During its war of independence, the Turkish Republic secured critical support from the Soviets by positioning itself as the defender of the Black Sea against the imperial machinations of the UK and France. In World War II, Türkiye maintained neutrality throughout most of the war to shield itself from the ravages of the war that swept all other nations, emerging as a regional anchor.
Türkiye’s pragmatic approach illustrates a viable path for middle powers seeking to break away from past ideological orthodoxies. Its geographic location, relative wealth, political stability, and resistance to external dominance offer a future course for other middle power states occupying similarly strategic positions in an increasingly regionally-based multipolar world. Like Türkiye, several other countries, with highly valued strategic assets and growing regional influence, aspire to escape the “blocization” of great powers.
Türkiye must be cautious of becoming a mini-empire, as imperial drive could be its undoing, as was the case with the Ottoman Empire. While a real possibility, “Overextension… could squander the natural geographic and logistical advantages held by regionally rooted middle powers.” In that, Matt argues that Türkiye needs to learn from its past, and particularly the events that lead to the downfall of the Ottoman state.
Moreover, while Türkiye does not have the structural and material capabilities to project power on a global scale, at least in the near future, it remains a critical actor in regional power struggles. Matt argues that the results of the municipal elections, in which the opposition won most municipalities, shows that the Turkish public wants its government to focus more on closer issues, such as Palestine, rather than more distant ambitions (such as Central Asia), which was the focus of the current government before the Ukraine War. The Erdogan government’s loss of the crucial city of Istanbul can be viewed as an indication that the electorate has not believed that Erdogan’s rhetoric, no matter how outspoken, has impacted bilateral relations, or produced effective action against Israel in light of its hostilities in Gaza. Nonetheless, in the changing domestic political landscape, Türkiye is unlikely to let go of its regional influence in the region of the East Mediterranean, “to the point that any impression of appeasement by its political elites could incite a populist reaction.”
In light of the rise of Türkiye and other middle powers, Matt further argues, the global landscape is witnessing the return of regionalism and locality, which may be the more important outcome here, in which a polycentric order is further taking shape around multiple regional systems. No longer is there a great power competition that pits two or three states with great power capacity against each other. As Matt predicts, this new polycentric, regional order may reverse or supplant globalization, “a phenomenon whose impact had always been vastly exaggerated.”
