There has been a significant shift in global geopolitics, with the unipolar order established after the Cold War gradually giving way to a new multipolar world where China and the BRICS nations are gaining influence. This shift is particularly evident in the Middle East, where China is filling in the vacuum left by the US as it refocuses on the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel by Hamas, have been a major turning point, likened to Israel’s own 9/11 or Pearl Harbor. The author argues that the attacks exposed the vulnerabilities of Israeli intelligence and defense and are likely to alter regional power dynamics. The conflict has strained efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, and has drawn attention back to the unresolved Palestinian issue. The resulting humanitarian crisis in Gaza could lead to a broader regional escalation, and it remains uncertain whether these events will accelerate or hinder the transition to a multipolar world order.
The Middle East has experienced major shifts in the 21st century, particularly as the US under former President Obama began reducing its presence in the region to focus on countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. This withdrawal decreased its strategic importance, allowing other powers like China and Russia to increase their involvement. Recent events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, and the Gaza conflict, have further accelerated these changes, signaling a potential shift from a unipolar to a multipolar or bipolar global order. US and China’s interests in the Middle East differ significantly. The US has reduced its energy dependence on the region, becoming the world’s leading oil producer, while China, as the largest global importer of hydrocarbons, has increased its economic ties through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Middle East remains a critical geopolitical area due to its vast hydrocarbon reserves and ongoing conflicts, making it a major arms market, particularly for the US. While the US often pairs diplomacy with military force, China has focused on economic and diplomatic efforts, fostering stability to protect its interests. As global power dynamics shift towards Asia, many Middle Eastern countries have strengthened their ties with China. Thus, the US views China’s growing influence as a major challenge to its global dominance, particularly in shaping Middle Eastern diplomacy, which could lead to a future conflict between the two powers. The October 7 attack and Israel’s response have further damaged the US’s image in the Middle East, with trust in the US declining in favor of Russia, China, and Iran.
In a January 2020 article, President Joe Biden expressed his intent to reverse former President Trump’s isolationist policies and restore US global leadership, focusing on shaping international rules and promoting collective security. He emphasized defending democracy against authoritarianism, though his Middle East policies showed continuity with his predecessors, particularly in maintaining unconditional support for Israel and isolating Iran. Biden’s Middle East strategy included deepening the Abraham Accords, which aimed to counter Iran by fostering Arab-Israeli reconciliation, thereby allowing the US to shift focus towards the Indo-Pacific to contain China. The 2022 National Security Strategy reaffirmed US support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the Biden administration did not challenge Israel’s expansionist policies. Critics argue that this approach is undermining the two-state solution, creating a situation likened to “apartheid” by various human rights organizations. The October 7 attack by Hamas exposed the limitations of Biden’s approach, as it reignited focus on the Palestinian issue, complicating US efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Arab states. The US responded by providing substantial military and political support to Israel, however, the authors argue that it remains unclear how the US will address the broader issues in the region, given the lack of a clear strategy to resolve the Gaza conflict and the constraints posed by other global challenges.
Over the past decade, China’s influence in the Middle East has significantly expanded, largely driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by President Xi Jinping. This initiative involves massive investments in infrastructure to enhance global connectivity and has been likened to a “Chinese Marshall Plan” aimed at global dominance and economic growth. As the world’s largest oil importer, China’s engagement in the Middle East is also motivated by its need for stable access to hydrocarbons, leading to increased political involvement to prevent regional conflicts. China has made substantial investments in key sectors across the Middle East, including telecommunications, logistics, and infrastructure, while also integrating the region into its broader strategic plans. The Arabian Peninsula, strategically positioned between Asia, Africa, and Europe, is particularly important. China has expanded its cooperation networks by including several Middle Eastern countries in organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. A significant moment in this relationship was Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022, where China signed numerous cooperation agreements, marking a shift in regional dynamics traditionally dominated by the US. China maintains strong relations with various Middle Eastern countries, including both sides of the Strait of Hormuz, balancing its ties with Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The article argues that despite its growing influence, China has not sought to replace the US as the primary security provider in the region. Instead, it has focused on economic and diplomatic engagement, as evidenced by its role in mediating the restoration of Saudi-Iranian relations in March 2023. However, China’s involvement in the region, particularly its relations with Israel, faces challenges due to security concerns and US pressure.
The Middle East has been undergoing a significant transformation, challenging longstanding paradigms established during the region’s national independence movements. Key issues being reevaluated include oil dependency, economic diversification, the role of religion, solidarity with the Palestinian cause, normalization with Israel, and relations with global powers like the US and China. This profound reconfiguration is expected to impact the region and the world at large. Regional powers are now moving towards de-escalation to reduce conflicts. Notable steps include Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 economic development plan, Turkey’s recalibration of relations with GCC countries, the end of the Qatar blockade with the Al-Ula Declaration in 2021, Israel’s regional integration through the Abraham Accords and talks with Saudi Arabia, and the resumption of diplomatic ties between Tehran and Riyadh after a seven-year break. This transitional period is shaping a new Middle East guided by three principles: the adoption of global strategic agreements, connectivity and apolarity, and cooperation to ensure security, reflecting a shift away from traditional geographic-based politics towards a focus on global partnerships, economic cooperation, and collective security.
According to the article, the October 7 attack by Hamas was intended to disrupt the ongoing normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which has been a significant focus of US foreign policy. The Trump administration’s Abraham Accords successfully established diplomatic relations between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, and the Biden administration has been working to include Saudi Arabia in this process. However, the Abraham Accords largely sidelined the Palestinian issue, unlike previous efforts like the Oslo Accords. Following the Abraham Accords, Morocco and Sudan also normalized relations with Israel after receiving concessions from the US, and Israel’s defense and security ties with these countries have deepened. Trade and military cooperation between Israel and the UAE have particularly intensified, with the UAE becoming a significant importer of Israeli arms and expanding its regional influence with a growing defense budget and military presence in various conflicts. Despite the diplomatic efforts, there has been strong opposition to normalization with Israel across the Arab world, as highlighted by the 2022 Arab Opinion Index. The survey showed widespread skepticism, with a large majority of respondents viewing Israel as a major threat to regional security and opposing recognition of the state. The attack and subsequent Israeli offensive in Gaza have further exposed the resistance to normalization, particularly in countries like Saudi Arabia, where support for normalization remains low. The competition for regional leadership between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar has also contributed to diverging foreign policies, undermining the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Since King Salman ascended to power in 2015 and his son, Mohamed bin Salman, became Crown Prince in 2017, Saudi Arabia has experienced profound political, economic, and social changes. Mohamed bin Salman has consolidated immense power, overseeing critical state matters, including the management of Aramco, the world’s largest oil company. As Saudi Arabia remains heavily dependent on oil, the kingdom has coordinated with Russia within OPEC+ to stabilize oil prices, a move that has strained relations with the US. To reduce its reliance on oil, Saudi Arabia has launched Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to diversify its economy by modernizing various sectors, boosting tourism, and investing in renewable energy. A key project under Vision 2030 is Neom, which seeks to enhance Saudi Arabia’s strategic position as a central hub connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa, increasing competition with the UAE. In foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has shifted from aggressive tactics to a more diplomatic approach, seeking regional stability to support Vision 2030. This is evident in the end of the blockade on Qatar in 2021 and the resumption of diplomatic ties with Iran in 2023, facilitated by China. De-escalating regional tensions is crucial for focusing on domestic development. Saudi Arabia is also considering joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel, but this process faces significant challenges. Saudi conditions for normalization include a mutual defense treaty with the US, assistance in developing a civil nuclear reactor, and advanced weaponry. However, as the author states, recognizing Israel could alienate much of the Arab and Islamic world, as it would likely be seen as abandoning the Palestinian cause. The October 7 Hamas attack and the subsequent Israeli offensive in Gaza have complicated the normalization process. While Saudi Arabia has paused contact with Israel and condemned its actions, it has stopped short of taking more drastic measures. A joint Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Riyadh called for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid but did not take stronger actions. Interestingly, Iran’s support for a two-state solution in the summit’s communiqué indirectly acknowledged Israel’s existence.
Iran has significantly expanded its regional influence, establishing a strategic sphere that stretches from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and reaching into Lebanon. This expansion is largely supported by Iran’s backing of Shiite governments and militias within the so-called Axis of Resistance. Iranian leadership views the United States and Israel as existential threats, which has driven its pursuit of nuclear capabilities as a defensive measure. Gregory Gause emphasizes that Iranian leaders perceive these nations as intent on dismantling the Islamic Republic, justifying Iran’s nuclear ambitions as necessary for survival against potential US-Israeli aggression. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iranian nuclear deal, initially halted Iran’s uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting sanctions that restricted its oil exports. However, the US withdrawal from the agreement under President Trump in 2018 reversed these gains. President Biden, while reopening negotiations, did not fully abandon Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach and instead focused on normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia to further isolate Iran. In response, Iran has deepened its alliances with Russia and China. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic partnership involving $400 billion in investments across various sectors. Iran and Russia have also bolstered their relations, particularly in military cooperation, with Iran supplying drones and missiles for Russia’s use in Ukraine. Additionally, President Ebrahim Raisi’s February 2023 visit to Beijing further solidified agreements under this partnership. Iran has also made strides in mending ties with Arab neighbors. The UAE restored relations with Tehran in August 2022, leading to a significant increase in trade. In a major diplomatic shift, Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic relations on March 10, 2023, after lengthy negotiations mediated by China. This reconciliation challenges US and Israeli efforts to isolate Iran and signals a decline in US influence in the region. The October 7 attack by Hamas and the subsequent Israeli offensive on Gaza have jeopardized the progress of normalization between Israel and the Arab world, as well as the rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf states. Hamas, a key ally of Iran within the Axis of Resistance, has been at the center of these tensions. Although Israel has accused Iran of direct involvement in the attack, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has publicly denied any foreknowledge or planning of the events, possibly to avoid provoking military retaliation from Israel or the US. In the wake of these developments, Iran has shown restraint, with limited conflict between Hezbollah and Israel and no large-scale escalation so far. Hezbollah has maintained a cautious stance, with its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, keeping all options open but avoiding a full declaration of war against Israel. Recent incidents, such as the killings of high-ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard official Sayyed Razi Mousavi, and Hamas leader Salah al-Aruri, have not significantly escalated the situation. Currently, Iran appears to favor asymmetric warfare tactics, exemplified by attacks from the Yemeni Shiite militia Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, on ships in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. This has prompted the US to launch Operation Sentinel to secure maritime navigation. In response to repeated Houthi attacks, the US and the UK conducted strikes against Houthi positions in Yemen on January 12, 2024.
